















Aboriginal	 parties;	 instead,	 they	 have	 a	 right	 to	 negotiate	 with	 developers,	 which	 has	 in	
practice	meant	very	 little	 leverage	 in	negotiations	 for	native	title	parties.	And	unlike	ALRA,	
developers	can	deal	with	any	 Indigenous	corporation,	rather	 than	 land	councils.	These	 two	
factors	 have	 encouraged	 opportunistic	 conduct	 by	 some	 developers	 and	 led	 to	 vexatious	
litigation	 designed	 to	 break	 the	 resistance	 of	 native	 title	 parties,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	












Indigenous	academics,	 such	as	Langton	and	Mazel	 (2012:	26),	say	 that	 these	 institutional	and	
cultural	 changes	 have	 been	 transformative.	 A	 number	 of	 law	 academics	 with	 recognised	
expertise	 in	 this	 area	have	 strongly	 endorsed	 the	 view	 that	 the	 institution	 of	 native	 title	 law,	
together	with	corporate	social	responsibility,	has	vastly	improved	the	situation	for	Indigenous	
Australians	faced	with	industrial	resources	developments	often	on	a	massive	scale.	For	instance,	
Tehan	 and	 Godden	 (2012:	 127)	 maintain	 that	 ‘recognition	 of	 native	 title	 has	 had	 a	
transformative	effect	on	relationships	between	Indigenous	peoples	and	the	resources	sector’.		
	
The	 iron	 ore	mining	 operations	 in	 the	 Pilbara	 region	 are	 cited	 especially	 as	 a	 place	 of	 great	
potential	 for	 disadvantaged	 Aborigines	 who	 have	 for	 decades	 been	 marginalised	 by	 mineral	





operating	 in	 the	Pilbara	–	 such	as	Rio	Tinto	which	now	employs	more	 than	1,500	Aborigines,	
along	 with	 BHP	 Billiton	 and	 Fortescue	Metals	 Group	 –	 asserting	 that	 Indigenous	 jobs	 in	 the	
mining	industry	have	been	a	critical	part	of	the	socio‐economic	transformation	of	Aborigines.	
	
Academics	have	emphasised	employment	 gains	 by	 Indigenous	people	because	 these	numbers	
are	more	 readily	measurable.	However,	much	 less	 is	known	about	 the	agreements	negotiated	





in	 the	 1970s,	 before	 the	 advent	 of	 federal	 native	 title	 law,	 when	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 obtain	
extensive	details	of	agreements	reached	in	the	Northern	Territory	(Altman	1983).	Thus,	despite	






to	developers,	 and	 that	 these	 advantages	are	magnified	by	 the	 substantial	 financial	 resources	
that	companies	have	available	compared	with	those	of	native	title	parties.	The	NTA’s	provisions	
do	not	 limit	 the	 use	 of	 aggressive	 and	opportunistic	 behaviour	 by	 companies;	 in	 fact,	 I	 argue	
they	actually	encourage	it.	While	gaining	 legal	recognition	of	native	title	to	traditional	 lands	is	
complex,	 cumbersome	 and	 costly	 for	 native	 title	 parties,	 developers	 can	 generally	 bank	 on	
getting	timely	access	to	those	same	lands	when	they	are	sought	for	development.	Furthermore,	
the	nature	of	the	NTA	is	likely	to	be	divisive	for	native	title	groups	especially	when	a	developer	





The	 case	 study	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 a	 long‐running	 dispute	 between	 the	 Yindjibarndi	
people	of	 the	Pilbara	region	and	Fortescue	Metals	Group	(FMG).	Close	scrutiny	of	this	dispute	
raises	 questions	 about	 claims	 that	 the	 NTA	 is	 a	 more	 efficient	 and	 equitable	 framework	 for	
resolving	disputes	between	native	title	parties	and	developers.	One	objective	of	the	legislation	
as	outlined	by	former	Prime	Minister	Paul	Keating	in	his	second	reading	speech	on	the	Native	













market	 efficiency.	 As	 observed	 by	McKenna,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 land	 council	 organisations	 can	
achieve	‘economies	of	scale’	because	of	their	size	while,	on	the	other	hand,	the	NTA’s	framework	
allows	smaller	groups	to	negotiate	directly	with	miners,	potentially	leading	to	better	economic	






whether	 to	 negotiate	 a	 mining	 agreement’	 (McKenna	 1995:	 11).	 However,	 there	 is	 little	
evidence	 to	 support	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 ALRA	 regime,	 especially	 its	 land	 councils	 and	 local	
communities’	rights	of	veto,	has	been	responsible	for	poor	economic	outcomes.	For	many	years	
the	 mining	 industry	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 has	 represented	 a	 major	 share	 of	 that	
jurisdiction’s	 economy,	 contributing	 more	 than	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 gross	 product.	 This	 level	 of	
resource	sector	activity	is	second	only	to	that	of	Western	Australia,	and	far	ahead	of	the	other	
five	Australian	states.	In	fact,	evidence	presented	in	this	case	study	indicates	that	the	absence	of	










work.	 YAC’s	 vigorous	 pursuit	 of	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	 UN	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	





of	 sourced	 documentation.	 The	 author	 used	 the	 federal	 Freedom	of	 Information	 (FoI)	 law	 to	
obtain	 a	 series	 of	 documents.	 Additionally,	 material	 amassed	 by	 YAC	 using	 the	 Western	
Australian	FoI	law	and	elsewhere	was	made	available	to	the	author.	Some	of	this	material	is	in	
the	form	of	confidential	documents	and	emails	that	reveal	a	great	deal	about	the	extent	to	which	
corporate	 interests	 are	 able	 to	 exploit	 weaknesses	 in	 relevant	 laws.	 This	 information	 is	
complemented	by	publicly	available	documents	such	as	records	of	appearances	before	judicial	




the	 values	 embedded	 in	 the	 statements	 and	 presentations	 made	 by	 company	 executives	 in	
relation	 to	 this	 dispute.	 The	 corporate	 culture	 that	 emerged	 inside	 FMG	 is	 explored	 through	
scrutiny	of	the	ways	in	which	earlier	negotiations	with	a	community	of	traditional	owners	in	the	
Pilbara	 were	 conducted	 and	 through	 examination	 of	 subsequent	 negotiations	 with	 YAC.	 The	
framing	 of	 debates	 on	 justice	 and	 compensation	 is	 a	 prominent	 dynamic	 in	 this	 case	 study,	
which	in	turn	brings	into	focus	the	power	imbalances	that	exist	between	companies	and	native	
title	 parties.	 In	 understanding	 and	 interpreting	 these	 dynamics,	 theories	 of	 justice	 are	
important.	 However,	 this	 case	 study	 highlights	 the	 limitations	 of	 conventional	 theories	 of	
justice,	 such	 as	 those	 in	 the	 Rawlsian	 tradition	 (Rawls	 1971),	 and	 thus	 underscores	 the	
significance	 of	 theories	 of	 justice	 as	 outlined	 by	Nancy	 Fraser	 (Fraser	 2009)	 and	 Iris	Marion	
Young	 (1990)	 that	 focus	 on	 concepts	 of	 recognition	 and	 oppression.	 Fraser	 in	 particular	
strongly	 argued	 that	 justice	 involves	 recognition	 of	 rights	 as	 well	 as	 redistribution.	 Fraser’s	
theoretical	 framework	 resonates	 in	 this	 dispute	 given	 that	 a	 powerful	 corporate	 interest	was	









press	 first‐order	claims.	 (Fraser	2009:	19‐20)	This	paper	argues	 that	 the	dispute	between	 the	
Yindjibarndi	people	and	FMG	corroborates	Fraser’s	arguments.	This	assertion	 is	borne	out	by	
the	behaviour	of	some	Yindjibarndi	elders	even	to	the	point	where	those	elders	who	supported	






time	 as	 the	 NTA	 received	 Royal	 Assent.	 This	 body	 is	 responsible	 for	 registering	 claims	 and	
dealing	promptly	and	efficiently	with	negotiations	where	an	agreement	had	not	been	reached	
after	 the	 prescribed	 period	 of	 six	 months.	 The	 Tribunal	 is	 not	 a	 court	 and	 does	 not	 decide	
whether	native	 title	exists	or	does	not	exist.	This	role	 is	 left	 to	 the	Federal	Court	of	Australia.	








In	 addition	 to	 arbitration,	 the	 NNTT's	 Native	 Title	 Registrar	 has	 a	 procedural	 role	 with	
responsibility	 for	 making	 administrative	 decisions	 about	 the	 registration	 of	 claimant	
applications	 and	 Indigenous	 Land	 Use	 Agreements,	 which	 came	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	
amendments	introduced	in	1998	(NNTT	2005).	According	to	Strelein	(2009:	6),	a	leading	native	
title	analyst,	the	process	managed	by	the	NNTT	puts	native	title	applicants	on	the	back	foot	from	
the	 outset	 because	 it	 ‘sets	 native	 title	 applicants	 in	 the	 position	 of	 having	 to	 “explain”	 their	
claims,	to	assert	legitimacy	and	to	ask	for	recognition	from	potentially	hundreds	of	“interested”	
parties	 and	 often	 recalcitrant	 state	 governments’.	 The	 skepticism	 among	 some	 Aboriginal	
people	about	the	role	of	the	NTA	as	a	facilitator	of	development	rather	than	of	Indigenous	rights	
is	 supported	 by	 Strelein	who	 says	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	NTA	were	 ‘primarily	 directed	 to	 the	
impact	on	the	granting	of	mining	leases’.	In	its	short	history,	the	NNTT	has	presided	over	more	





to	 native	 title	 parties	 under	 this	 regime	 and	 it	 can	 often	 prove	 to	 be	 of	 little	 value.	 In	
determining	whether	the	negotiations	have	been	conducted	in	good	faith,	the	tribunal	has	asked	


















which	 was	 acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Njamal	 People	 (see	 Fortescue	Metals	 Group	 Ltd/Western	







The	deficiencies	 in	s.	31	 led	the	 former	Federal	Labor	government	to	propose	amendments	 in	
the	form	of	the	Native	Title	Amendment	Bill	2012	which	proposed	a	reverse	onus	of	proof	on	





After	 inhabiting	 the	 high	 country	 of	 the	 Pilbara	 region	 of	 Western	 Australia	 for	 tens	 of	
thousands	 of	 years,	 most	 Yindjibarndi	 people	 now	 live	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Roebourne	 and	




September	 1983	 death	 of	 16‐year‐old	 Yindjibarndi	 boy	 John	 Peter	 Pat	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 local	
police	 led	 to	 a	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 Aboriginal	 deaths	 in	 custody.	 Today,	 one	 of	 the	major	
pieces	of	 new	 infrastructure	 in	Roebourne	 is	a	prison	opened	 in	March	1984	which	has	been	
continually	 expanded	 since	 then.	 Located	 just	 5km	 from	 the	 town	 centre,	 its	 operational	
capacity	of	161	inmates	is	regularly	exceeded.	This	prison	for	the	Pilbara	and	Kimberly	regions	
has	 ‘a	 high	 percentage	 of	 Aboriginal	 prisoners’	 (Department	 of	 Corrective	 Services	 2013).	 In	
fact,	the	prison	population	is	more	than	80	per	cent	Indigenous.	
	
Despite	 the	 overwhelming	poverty	 and	disadvantage	 experienced	by	 the	Yindjibarndi	 people,	
they	formed	their	own	corporation	under	Federal	law	in	1994,	just	three	months	after	the	NTA	
received	 Royal	 Assent.	 Under	 the	 native	 title	 law,	 the	 Yindjibarndi	 Aboriginal	 Corporation	 is	
known	as	a	prescribed	body	corporate,	which	means	that	it	holds	native	title	rights	and	acts	on	
behalf	of	 the	Yindjibarndi	people	when	dealing	with	native	 title	matters.4	YAC’s	 incorporation	
coincided	with	 discussions	 among	 the	Ngarluma	 and	 Yindjibarndi	 people	 that	were	 aimed	 at	
lodging	 a	 native	 title	 claim	 and	 were	 led	 by	 the	 former	 Premier	 of	Western	 Australia,	 Peter	
Dowding,	in	the	town	of	Roebourne.	 
	
On	 December	 20,	 1994,	 the	 NNTT	 formally	 registered	 the	 Ngarluma‐Yindjibarndi	 land	 claim.	
Registration	 of	 a	 claim	 is	 a	 significant	milestone	 for	 native	 title	 groups	 because	 claims	must	
meet	12	conditions	specified	in	the	NTA.	As	a	result,	registration	carries	with	it	 implicit	rights	
and	is	considered	to	be	 just	as	 important	as	obtaining	a	determination	because	 it	can	provide	
the	 basis	 for	 negotiations	 with	 developers.	 Almost	 a	 decade	 later,	 on	 3	 July	 2003,	 Justice	
Nicholson	 granted	 a	 determination	 of	 Native	 Title	 to	 these	 two	 peoples	 in	 the	 form	 of	 non‐
exclusive	 possession	 and	 designated	 YAC	 as	 the	 prescribed	 body	 corporate	 for	 its	 successful	
claim	(Daniel	v	Western	Australia	[2003]	FCA	666	18).	Just	one	week	after	Nicholson	issued	his	
native	 title	 determination,	 YAC	 submitted	 a	 new	 claim	 to	 the	 NNTT	 in	 an	 area	 adjoining	 the	













Shortly	 after	 the	 July	 2003	 decision	 in	 which	 Nicholson	 found	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Yindjibarndi	
people,	FMG	began	staking	out	 ‘landholdings’	 in	 the	Pilbara	 that	reached	 into	 land	claimed	by	
YAC	 and	 subsequently	 registered	 with	 the	 NNTT	 in	 2005.	 From	 2003	 onwards,	 FMG	 began	
lodging	applications	for	exploration	rights	in	both	the	Yindjibarndi	Determination	Area	and	the	







of	 any	 study	 of	 this	 company.	 In	 the	 space	 of	 five	 years,	 Forrest	 transformed	 a	 small	 listed	
company	with	a	handful	of	prospects	into	a	major	iron	ore	exporter.	A	key	part	of	the	company's	
success	 has	 relied	 on	 a	 very	 strict	 approach	 to	 costs	 and	 efficiency,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	





overlap	 native	 title	 land	 and	 claim	 areas.	 FMG	 has	 taken	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 land	 access	
agreements	with	traditional	owners	to	that	of	established	iron	ore	producers	Rio	Tinto	and	BHP	
Billiton	in	that	it	has	emphasised	jobs	and	training	for	Indigenous	Australians	and	used	highly	
loaded	 language	 to	dismiss	 financial	 compensation	such	as	 labelling	 it	 ‘mining	welfare’.	When	




In	 July	 2003,	 Andrew	 Forrest	 acquired	 a	 stake	 in	 a	 small	 iron	 ore	 miner,	 Allied	 Mining	 and	
Processing,	which	held	mineral	exploration	leases	in	the	Pilbara,	and	then	changed	the	name	to	
Fortescue	 Metals	 Group,	 reflecting	 the	 heritage	 of	 the	 region	 associated	 with	 his	 great‐great	
uncle,	 the	 former	 Western	 Australia	 Premier	 John	 Forrest.	 Andrew	 Forrest	 acquired	 his	
controlling	stake	in	the	company	for	just	8c	a	share	and,	after	converting	all	of	his	options,	his	
total	 cash	 investment	 of	 $8	million	was,	 by	 January	 2005,	worth	 $400	million	 (Burrell	 2013:	




of	 the	Chinese	government	 to	expedite	projects.	 In	a	2008	shareholder	presentation	company	
executives	said	that	while	‘Australia	is	well‐managed	for	a	free	democratic	society,	China	is	even	
better	able	to	handle	a	crisis	….’	(FMG	2008).	The	presentation	pointed	out	that	the	new	airport	
in	 Beijing	went	 from	 approval	 to	 completion	 in	 three	 years,	 whereas	 the	 new	 Terminal	 5	 at	
Heathrow	airport	in	London	involved	four	years	of	public	consultation	followed	by	six	years	of	
construction	(FMG	2008).	FMG	wanted	 to	adopt	a	similar	approach	to	 the	approvals	required	




vast	 number	 of	 potential	 mine	 sites.	 By	 2006,	 it	 had	 already	 accumulated	 32,000	 square	
kilometres	 of	 tenements,	 more	 than	 double	 the	 combined	 tenements	 of	 Rio	 Tinto	 and	 BHP	
Billiton,	 two	companies	 that	had	been	operating	 in	 the	Pilbara	since	 the	1960s.	The	company	
had	even	acquired	exploration	rights	that	extended	out	to	sea	for	about	20	kilometres	along	500	








FMG’s	 first	 mines	 were	 Cloudbreak	 and	 Christmas	 Creek,	 located	 in	 the	 Pilbara's	 Chichester	
Ranges	 about	 260km	 south	 of	 Port	 Hedland.	 Both	mines	 straddled	 the	 upper	 reaches	 of	 the	
Fortescue	 River	 (see	 Map	 2).	 The	 myriad	 of	 approvals	 required	 to	 open	 this	 mine	 included	
negotiations	with	the	elders	of	four	communities	who	held	native	title	claims	within	the	mining	














One	of	 the	 four	groups,	 the	Nyiyaparli,	was	preparing	a	claim	for	36,684	square	kilometres	of	
land	overlapping	the	FMG	tenements.	The	claim	was	registered	with	the	NNTT	on	1	September	
2005	 (NNTT	2005).	 Two	months	 earlier,	 FMG	had	 secured	 an	 agreement	with	 the	Nyiyaparli	
people	by	using	a	tactic	that	might	be	described	as	divisive.	The	four	groups	were	represented	
by	 the	 Pilbara	 Native	 Title	 Service	 (PNTS),	 which	 was	 the	 Pilbara‐based	 subsidiary	 of	 the	
Yamatji	 Marlpa	 Aboriginal	 Corporation	 (YMAC),	 a	 registered	 native	 title	 body	 corporate	 that	
represented	 traditional	owners	 in	negotiations	with	mining	 interests.	Partly	as	a	 result	of	 the	
difficult	 and	drawn‐out	negotiations	with	FMG,	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 four	groups	and	
PNTS	broke	down.	FMG	saw	this	as	an	opportunity	to	broker	a	deal	with	some	of	the	Nyiyaparli	
elders.	Forrest	had	a	relationship	with	one	of	the	six	elders,	the	74‐year‐old	Andrew	Stock,	who	
had	worked	 on	 the	 Forrest	 family’s	Mindaroo	 station	 in	 the	 Pilbara,	where	 Stock	 had	 taught	
Forrest	 and	 his	 brothers	 to	 ride	 horses	 (Priest	 2006:	 44).	 The	 financial	 compensation	 in	 the	





The	 August	 2005	 agreement	 signed	 by	 Stock	 and	 five	 other	 Nyiyaparli	 native	 title	 claimants	
removed	 significant	 cultural	 heritage	 and	 environmental	 provisions	 that	 had	 been	 agreed	
between	FMG	and	 the	Nyiyaparli	 in	earlier	negotiations,	 and	 it	was	signed	without	 the	elders	
having	 legal	 representation	 present.	 The	 broader	 Nyiyaparli	 claimant	 group	 disavowed	 the	
agreement	 two	weeks	 later,	and	Stock	said	he	had	not	known	what	he	was	agreeing	 to.	Stock	
was	quoted	in	the	media	the	day	after	signing	saying:	 ‘I	didn’t	know	what	was	going	on.	 I	 feel	










The	approach	 taken	by	FMG	 in	 these	negotiations	with	 the	Nyiyaparli	people	and	subsequent	
ones	 with	 YAC	 was	 outlined	 in	 a	 series	 of	 emails	 sent	 by	 staff	 and	 advisers	 in	 2006	 as	 the	
company	 was	 racing	 towards	 first	 production	 from	 its	 Cloudbreak	 mine.	 The	 emails	 were	
obtained	by	YAC	in	late	2011	and	then	posted	on	its	website	in	August	2012.	YAC	first	referred	
to	them	in	a	press	release	dated	29	August	2012	(YAC	2012).	The	authenticity	of	the	emails	has	
never	 been	 challenged	 by	 FMG	or	 any	 other	 party,	 according	 to	 YAC	Chief	 Executive	Michael	
Woodley.	However,	YAC’s	senior	executives	agreed	to	shut	down	their	website	 in	July	2013	in	




and	 undermine	 their	 confidence	 in	 their	 legal	 representative,	 PNTS.	 Instead,	 the	 company	
wanted	 these	 groups	 to	 seek	 new	 legal	 representation	 funded	 by	 FMG.	 The	 emails	 discussed	
‘efforts	 to	 get	 PNTS	 out	 of	 the	 heritage	 picture’	 and	 of	 ‘executing	 a	 multifaceted	 strategy	 to	
counter	PNTS’s	ability	to	impede	[FMG’s]	achievement	of	outcomes	with	the	blackfellas’.	At	the	
heart	was	a	strategy	to	put	PNTS	under	immense	pressure	and	undermine	its	ability	to	organise	
itself	 due	 to	 a	 ‘barrage’	 of	 ‘expedited’	 litigation	 prosecuted	 at	 a	 ‘gruelling	 pace’.	 The	 strategy	









be	 highly	 advantageous	 to	maintain	 the	 defamation	writs	 against	 PNTS	 and	 its	
operatives.	This	is	consistent	with	the	way	I	have	presented	the	battle	lines	and	

















we	 ready	 to	 go	 now	 or	 do	we	 need	 that	 time	 anyway?’	 (unpublished	 email	 dated	 31	 August	
2005;	held	by	author).	
	
The	Perth	 lawyer	explained	in	an	August	2005	email	 to	FMG’s	 ‘litigation	coordinator’	how	the	





Nyiyaparli	 people	 (unpublished	 correspondence	 dated	 31	 August;	 held	 by	 author).	 This	
included	 replacing	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Applicant	 to	 the	 claim	 nominated	 by	 the	 Nyiyaparli	
community	with	FMG‐favoured	Applicant	members,	which	is	exactly	the	tactic	used	in	the	later	
dispute	with	YAC.	Replacing	 the	members	of	 the	Applicant	 could	 be	 achieved	by	going	 to	 the	
Federal	Court	and	using	a	section	of	the	NTA	which	was	intended	for	use	by	claim	communities.	
Using	 the	 term	 ‘one’	 as	 the	 pronoun	 for	 the	 company,	 the	 lawyer	 explained:	 ‘To	 replace	
Applicants,	one	applies	to	the	Federal	Court	for	an	order	that	one	or	more	of	the	applicants	be	
replaced:	 see	 s66B	of	 the	NTA’.	Although	FMG	wanted	a	 fast	 resolution	of	 the	 issues	with	 the	
Nyiyaparli,	the	lawyer	outlined	an	aggressive	and	ambitious	litigation	strategy	that,	while	being	
more	 time	 consuming,	 would	 have	 the	 benefit	 of	 wearing	 down	 the	 PNTS.	 He	wrote	 that	 he	
favoured	 seeking	 admission	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 Expedited	 List	 to	 obtain	 an	 accelerated	






In	 2007,	 as	 the	 negotiations	 between	 the	 two	 parties	 were	 reaching	 a	 crucial	 stage,	 YAC	
appointed	 37‐year‐old	 Michael	 Woodley	 as	 its	 new	 Chief	 Executive.	 Woodley	 is	 a	 highly	
articulate	 individual,	despite	having	 left	school	at	sixth	grade,	and	he	has	consistently	 taken	a	
rights‐based	 approach	 to	 the	 dispute.	 He	 personifies	 the	 community’s	 experience	 with	 the	
mining	 industry	 over	 the	past	 40	years.	His	mother	 Susie	was	one	 of	many	 young	Aboriginal	
women	in	 the	region	who	became	a	 teenage	mother	as	a	result	of	a	brief	 liaison	with	a	white	
mine	worker.	Michael	Woodley	has	never	known	his	 father	and	was	raised	by	his	grandfather	
Woodley	King	who,	 along	with	 other	 elders,	 educated	 him	 in	 traditional	 law.	Despite	 gaining	
employment	 in	 the	mining	 industry,	Michael	Woodley	subsequently	 chose	 to	work	 in	 cultural	





Act	1972	has	 two	key	sections	 that	are	designed	 to	 facilitate	development	 that	 impacts	on,	or	
destroys,	 Aboriginal	 heritage.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 developers	 need	 to	 obtain	 the	








In	 early	 2008,	while	 the	dispute	over	heritage	 surveys	was	ongoing,	 FMG	 commenced	 formal	
negotiations	 for	 a	 land	 access	 agreement	 covering	 Yindjibarndi	 country.	 In	 terms	 of	 financial	
wherewithal,	the	disparity	between	the	two	entities	could	not	have	been	greater.	In	the	2007‐08	
financial	 year,	 YAC	 reported	 income	of	 $115,705,	whereas	FMG	earned	 gross	 income	of	 $201	
million	and	reported	a	trading	profit	of	$72	million.	
	
In	 a	meeting	 attended	 by	 Chairman	 Andrew	 Forrest	 on	 10	March	 2008,	 FMG	 again	 pursued	
what	it	called	a	‘Whole	of	Claim	Land	Access	Agreement’	which	involved	YAC	granting	‘any	and	







on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Indigenous	 Peoples.	 It	 said	 that	 in	 return	 for	 the	 free,	 prior	 and	 informed	
consent	 of	 the	 Yindjibarndi	 People,	 FMG	 should	 pay	 YAC	 an	 ‘un‐capped’	 5	 per	 cent	 royalty,	
equivalent	to	the	royalty	paid	to	the	state	government.	At	this	meeting,	Forrest	declared	native	
title	 did	 not	 equate	 to	 property	 rights	 and	 therefore	 native	 title	 parties	were	 not	 entitled	 to	
compensation	 (Irving	 2011:	 9).	 This	 line	 of	 argument	 has	 been	 used	 inconsistently	 by	 senior	
FMG	executives	in	their	background	briefings	to	third	parties.	However,	some	years	later	in	July	
2012,	FMG	applied	to	the	Federal	Court	to	be	joined	as	a	respondent	party	to	the	Yindjibarndi	
#1	 Native	 Title	 Claim,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 faced	 a	 compensation	 liability	 if	 the	 claim	
succeeded	(NC	(deceased)	v	State	of	Western	Australia	[2012]	FCA	773).		
	
At	 a	 negotiation	 session	 in	Roebourne	 on	 10‐12	 June	 2008	 (that	 is,	 subsequent	 to	 the	March	
2008	 meeting),	 FMG	 was	 represented	 by	 land	 access	 manager	 Blair	 McGlew	 while	 YAC	 was	
represented	 by	 its	 directors	 and	 elders,	 along	with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 YAC	members.	 At	 this	




recording	 of	 this	 meeting	 made	 by	 YAC	 shows	 that	 FMGs’s	 chief	 negotiator	 Blair	 McGlew	
responded	to	 the	request	with:	 ‘[t]hat	number	 is	extortionally	 [sic]	high,	 it’s	way	beyond,	 it	 is	
probably	10	times	higher	than	any	other	number’.	Later	in	the	day	McGlew	explained	how	such	
a	 royalty	was	 completely	 inconsistent	with	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 FMG	 in	 its	 intent	 to	 drive	
down	costs	to	the	bare	minimum:	
	
FMG	wants	 to	be	 the	 lowest	 cost	 iron	ore	producer—that's	 our	 goal,	 that’s	our	
number	one	goal	out	 there.	And	we	recognise	 that	we	don’t	pay	quite	 the	same	
money	as	some	other	companies,	so	we	have	put	our	energy	and	focus	into	other	
areas,	 and	 that	 is	 employment	 support	 and	 business	 support.	 (McGlew	 in	 YAC	
2008)	
	
When	asked	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 statement	 in	a	2011	 interview,	Andrew	Forrest	 said	McGlew's	
comments	did	not	apply	to	Indigenous	settlements.	Rather,	Forrest	thought	that:		
	
…	he	was	 referring	 to	 the	mining	costs	 and	operating	and	shipping	costs	Kerry	
[O’Brien,	the	interviewer].	It's,	I	mean	we're	not	the	lowest	cost	when	it	comes	to	
Aboriginal	 involvement	 and	 we	 are	 one	 of	 the	 most	 expensive	 ...	 We	 do	 want	
always	our	overall	cost	to	be	as	competitive	as	possible,	it	is	how	we	can	survive	




However,	 at	 the	 June	2008	meeting,	McGlew	made	clear	 that,	 if	YAC	did	not	accept	 the	 terms	
offered	 by	 FMG,	 the	 company	 would	 use	 considerable	 legal	 leverage	 to	 get	 its	 way.	 And	 he	
justified	 this	 approach	by	saying	 the	company	was	 in	a	 rush	 to	develop,	declaring:	 ‘Fortescue	


















million	 a	 year	 over	 the	 life	 of	 the	mine.	 It	 added	 $6.5	million	 a	 year	 in	 unspecified	 jobs	 and	








Based	 on	 Rio	 Tinto	 and	 BHP	 Billiton	 settlements	 and	 FMG’s	 planned	 production	 levels5,	 the	
Yindjibarndi	people	might	have	benefitted	from	an	income	stream	of	at	least	$30	million	a	year,	
with	a	 substantial	 share	of	 these	payments	paid	 into	a	 trust	 fund	which	would	 fund	business	




then	 asking	 YAC	 to	 arrange	 a	 community	 meeting	 so	 that	 it	 could	 be	 satisfied	 that	 all	
Yindjibarndi	people	were	aware	of	 this	offer.	 In	February	2010,	FMG	negotiator	Blair	McGlew	
raised	the	prospect	of	organising	his	own	community	meeting,	and	then	circulated	throughout	
Roebourne	 the	 ‘Yindjibarndi‐Fortescue	 Information	 Paper’.	 This	 paper	 said	 YAC	 was	 asking	
‘way	too	much’	and	FMG	would	go	to	NNTT	to	secure	its	mining	licences.	FMG’s	assertion	that	






lawyer	Alexa	Morcombe	and	McGlew	 focused	 instead	on	 the	negotiations	and	 the	prospect	of	
YAC	 securing	a	 favourable	outcome.	The	 conveners	 told	 the	 attendees	 that	 there	was	no	way	
that	YAC	could	win	in	court	and	that	they	should	accept	the	FMG	offer.	YAC’s	chances	were	‘all	










Court	 action	 to	 have	 YAC	wound	up,	 and	 a	 Federal	 Court	Action	 to	 have	 the	members	 of	 the	
Applicant	 for	 the	 native	 title	 claim	 replaced.	 These	 demands	 drove	 YAC’s	 sole	 legal	 counsel	
George	 Irving	 to	 exhaustion	and	 reinforced	a	perception	 in	 the	 community	 that	 there	was	no	

















































Following	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 by	 FMG	 to	 again	 secure	 YAC	 involvement	 in	 heritage	
clearances,	the	Wirlu‐murra	Yindjibarndi	Aboriginal	Corporation	(WMYAC)	was	registered	with	
the	Federal	 government’s	Office	of	 the	Registrar	of	 Indigenous	Corporations	on	23	November	





FMG.	 The	 meeting	 was	 proposed	 by	 three	 of	 seven	 members	 of	 the	 Applicant	 for	 the	




 All	objections	made	under	 the	Mining	Act	1978	(WA)	on	behalf	of	 the	Yindjibarndi	#1	


















This	 tactic	would	have	succeeded	had	YAC	not	 taken	 the	 initiative	and	matched	 this	 effort	by	
calling	 its	 own	 s.66	 (b)	 meeting	 a	 year	 later,	 in	 March	 2012.	 YAC	 then	 joined	 WMYAC’s	
application	 to	 the	 Federal	 Court	 and	 became	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Replacement	 Applicant'.	 In	 a	
separate	avenue	of	 legal	pressure	on	YAC,	FMG	funded	and	initiated	an	action	in	the	Supreme	
Court	 of	 Western	 Australia	 to	 have	 an	 administrator	 appointed	 to	 YAC.	 FMG	 provided	
substantial	 funding	 to	 WMYAC	 for	 both	 the	 Federal	 and	 Supreme	 Court	 challenges.	 For	 the	
2011‐12	 financial	year,	WMYAC	reported	gross	 revenue	of	$8.5	million	and	net	assets	of	$3.6	
million	(WMYAC	2013)	The	main	source	of	revenue	was	described	in	the	notes	to	the	accounts	
as	 ‘services’	 income	which	 included	 $1.6	million	 from	 FMG	 in	 addition	 to	 $2.98	million	 from	





staged	 by	WMYAC/FMG	because	he	 declared	 that	 this	meeting	would	be	made	 redundant	 by	
YAC’s	 s66b	 March	 2012	 meeting	 (FCA	 70,	 9‐10).	 McKerracher	 dismissed	 the	 validity	 of	 the	
WMYAC	 meeting	 with	 a	 deft	 touch.	 He	 said	 that	 had	 the	 opposition	 to	 YAC’s	 authorisation	
meeting	been	successful,	then	of	course	he	would	have	considered	the	2011	meeting.	But	given	
this	was	 not	 the	 case,	 then	 ‘the	 2011	meeting	 arguments	 fall	 away’	 (NC	 (deceased)	 v	State	of	
Western	 Australia	 (No	 2)	 [2013]	 FCA	 70	 [13]).	 The	 preparation	 undertaken	 by	 YAC	 for	 the	




The	 2012	meeting	was	 entirely	 professional,	 balanced	 and	 careful.	 There	 is	 no	
technical	 reason	 why	 the	 Replacement	 Applicant	 should	 not	 succeed	 in	 their	
application	and	the	potential	disharmony	between	the	two	groups	 is	something	
which	is	unlikely	to	be	resolved	simply	by	refusing	the	application.	For	all	those	




proved	 to	be	 a	huge	moral	 victory	 for	YAC.	 Chief	Executive	Michael	Woodley	 argued	 that	 the	
Federal	 Court	 had	 provided	 the	 Yindjibarndi	 people	with	 the	 ‘safety	 net’	 that	 it	 needed.	 The	
















After	 six	 years	 of	 costly	 resistance	 and	 wrangling	 through	 the	 courts	 and	 the	 tribunal,	 FMG	
began	mining	on	 land	claimed	by	 the	Yindjibarndi	people	under	 the	Native	Title	Act	1993	and	
registered	 with	 the	 National	 Native	 Title	 Tribunal	 but	 without	 paying	 compensation	 to	 the	
Yindjibarndi	Aboriginal	Corporation.	The	Solomon	Hub’s	Firetail	mine	has	produced	almost	20	
million	tonnes	of	iron	ore	since	opening	in	May	2013	(FMG	2014),	earning	the	company	around	
$2	billion	 in	 revenue	 alone.	 The	Kings	Deposit,	which	 commenced	operations	 in	March	2014,	
will	boost	annual	production	by	another	40	million	tonnes	and	earn	around	$3.5	billion	a	year	at	




This	 dispute	 bears	many	 of	 the	 hallmarks	 identified	 by	 Australian	 and	 international	 scholars	


























1	This	 research	was	carried	out	while	 the	author	was	a	doctoral	 candidate	at	 the	Centre	 for	Aboriginal	
Economic	 Policy	 Research	 at	 the	 Australian	 National	 University,	 Canberra.	 Conferral	 of	 his	 PhD	 is	
scheduled	for	late	December	2014.	


















the	 Eastern	Gurama	determination	 area	 because	 it	 has	 an	 Indigenous	 Land	Use	Agreement	with	 this	
group,	but	it	often	fails	to	mention	the	Yindjibarndi	interest	perhaps	because	it	has	no	such	agreement.   
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